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the right-of-way and started the fire. The court held that defendant
was negligent in maintaining his property in such condition and
that the intervening cause did not absolve him from liability. In
Newton v. Texas Company46 defendant maintained a distributing
plant where he stored large quantities of gasoline. Gas leaked from
the warehouse and into the street. In imposing liability for the ensuing explosion, the court said that a reasonable inference could be
drawn that the spark came from a passing train, from carelessly
discarded matches, cigarettes, or otherwise. Thus Phelps cannot be
correctly explained on the grounds of an intervening cause which
may have ignited the combustibles.
These cases indicate that the court has taken a very restrictive approach to the issue of causal relationship. While all the reasons
may not be apparent, the implications are quite clear-trial practitioners who find themselves confronted with the issue of cause had
best proceed with utmost care.
JAMES

G.

BILLINGS

Torts-Products Liability-Is Privity Dead?
The movement to abolish the privity requirement in "warranty"
actions has in the past decade played an increasingly successful role
in the American judicial theater.' The crusade has not left the
North Carolina Supreme Court unaffected, and a recent decision by
that court may prove to be the signal for privity's final exit from the
legal stage in North Carolina.
In Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Company' the North Carolina
Supreme Court sustained a complaint based on warranty and
" 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920). The court said:
[I]f the defendant, by its negligence, produced a situation or condition
of danger by allowing gasoline to escape . . . where it would probably
come into contact with fire, sparks . . . or live ashes from a lighted
cigar or cigarette . . . we do not see why this would not be negligence ....
[I] f the negligence of the defendant combined with the
act of some other person . . . the defendant would be liable, though
he had no connection with the conduct of the third party and had no
control over him.
Id. at 563-64, 105 S.E. at 434.
' Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
2271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
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negligence even though no privity of contract existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant-manufacturer. Plaintiff, a farmer, purchased a chemical weed killer from a retail seller who in turn had
procured it from the distributor, an agent of the manufacturer.
Instructions on the bags of the chemical specified its use as a weed
killer on corn, but warned against planting another stand of corn or
other crop of the small grain variety on the same land in the same
year. Plaintiff used the chemical on his corn crop with satisfactory
results. The following year the plaintiff planted soybeans and peanuts on the land and due to the low yield and poor quality he suffered financial loss for which he brought suit.
The privity rule for warranty and negligence actions has traditionally been an obstacle to the consumer for recovery from the manufacturer. The court explicitly removed this barrier in negligence
actions-a rather hollow victory since the "inherently dangerous"
exception had already swallowed the rule 3 -but just how far the
court went in discarding privity in "warranty" actions is uncertain.
To understand the changed position taken by Corprew, a brief
review of case law on the privity requirement is necessary, including a look at a recent food and drink case which may have significant consequences in this area.4 North Carolina freed itself
from the doctrine of caveat emptor and adopted the rule of implied
warranty in sales between purchaser and seller as early as 1925.,
In an early decision dealing with food,' however, the court held that
no liability to the ultimate consumer arose on an implied warranty
where no contractual relation, i.e., privity, existed between the manufacturer and the consumer. The manufacturer, said the court, was
not an insurer of his product. An exception was recognized to the
privity requirement in Simpson v. American Oil Company.7 A spray
can of "Annox" insecticide purchased by the plaintiff had a statement printed on it informing the user that the contents were deadly
to bugs, but non-poisonous to human beings. The plaintiff deGwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302 (1960);
Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959).
'Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N.C. 162, 129 S.E. 543 (1925).
'Thompson v. Ballard & Ballard, 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). The
plaintiff sued for breach of implied warranty when he became ill after eating
baked bread and subsequently discovered a dead mouse in the sack of flour
produced by the defendant, but bought at a local grocery.
1217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
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veloped a severe skin ailment after spraying a room with the insecticide and brought suit against the manufacturer. The court
held that where an express warranty on the product's container
was addressed to the ultimate consumer no privity was required.
In Davis v. Radford8 the plaintiff's intestate died after using a salt
substitute which contained poisonous ingredients. Suit was brought
only against the retailer, but in dictum the court suggested that,
based upon Simpson, the plaintiff could bring an action against the
distributor on implied warranty despite the lack of privity. The
court said that the wholesale distributor would be primarily liable
since the retail seller could recover over against him. By a later
holding9 it seems that to come within the Simpson rule in non-food
cases, the express warranty must appear on the package itself and be
addressed to the ultimate consumer. Yet language in another case
strictly limits the Simpson doctrine to food and drink for human
consumption sold in sealed containers with labels addressed to the
purchaser. ° A green fly in a soft drink bottle offered the court an
opportunity to re-examine its policy on privity in implied warranty
actions in Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Company," but the court
reaffirmed its view that warranty was contractual in nature and required privity. A concurring opinion, 2 however, argued for privity's
abandonment and gave the first suggestion of possible change.
This, then, was the procedure generally followed in an implied
warranty action before the court altered its position. One injured by
a defect in a product could bring an action on implied warranty only
against the immediate seller with whom he was in the "holy state
of privity."' The seller, in turn, could seek redress on the same
theory against the distributor or manufacturer who was in privity
with him.' 4 The obvious defects in this procedure are that the retailer may be insolvent, there may be a multiplicity of actions, the
suit may become barred by the statute of limitations, and often the
court may lack jurisdiction over the parties.
8233 N.C. 583, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
'Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367 (1963).
" Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 136
S.E.2d 56 (1964).
11263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
1 Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754.
12 Aldridge Motors, Inc. v. Alexander, 217 N.C. 751, 9 S.E.2d 469 (1935).
1'Id.
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In Tedder v. Pepsi Cola Bottling
a decision handed
down in the late spring of 1967, the first shift took place. A woman
became ill after drinking a portion of the defendant's bottled beverage which contained deleterious matter. She sued the bottler for
breach of implied warranty of fitness though the drink was purchased at a local supermarket. The bottler's employee had placed the
bottles on the shelves of the grocer, and the plaintiff was the only
person to handle the bottle before opening. The court held that the
mass advertising conducted by the bottler and the direct manner of
travel of the product from the bottler to the consumer were sufficient
to take the case to the jury on the theory of implied warranty. The
court stopped short of abolishing the privity requirement in the
food and drink area. Whether or not a manufacturer by placing
his product on the market impliedly warrants to the ultimate consumer that the food and drink in sealed containers is fit for human
use was not decided by the court. However, the court did make reference to the legal principles of Justice Sharp's concurrence in
Terry which had argued for privity's repudiation in cases involving
food products. Tedder can be viewed as a narrow decision, limiting
the area emancipated from the privity requirement to cases of food
and drink sold in sealed containers where there has been mass advertisement and direct travel of the product to the consumer.
What is Corprez's affect on the privity requirement? The decision lacks clarity and is open to at least four possible interpretations.
(1) The narrowest interpretation would limit the area free of
the privity rule to cases where a product was sold in a sealed package
which contained a label of warning or instruction. If either element
were lacking, the consumer would have to meet the privity requirement to state a cause of action against the manufacturer. For example, if a new outboard motor boat sunk shortly after being
launched and several persons were drowned, the owner could not sue
the maker even if a label appeared on the vessel since it was not sold
in a sealed package.
(2) Under a less narrow interpretation of Corprew, the privity
rule would be eliminated in cases where the article is sold in a sealed
container. Both Tedder and Corprew involve products marketed in
closed packages. Under this interpretation a label or advertising
would not be required, but the privity rule would still be viable for
" 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
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such products as lawn mowers, automobiles, and airplanes which
are not sold in sealed packages. The matter of the sealed container,
however, would seem to go more to the evidence of breach as is discussed later.
(3) Since the court found that the statement on the package
amounted to an express warranty that the chemical would not be
harmful to crops planted in the next year, a third interpretation is
that the court in effect was restating the doctrine set out in the
earlier Simpson decision, i.e., that where a warranty appears on the
product addressed to the ultimate consumer no privity is required.
Under this interpretation it is the label, not the container, that is important. Thus the exception to the privity rule would again include
non-food items. If so construed, privity would remain a requirement
except where a label of warning or instruction is printed on the
product; or where, as in Tedder, there is mass advertising which can
be viewed as equivalent to a label. The court's thinking quite possibly could revolve around the notion that the label or mass advertising bridges the gap between the manufacturer and consumer and
creates a type of privity or bond between the two sufficient to sustain
an action. This reasoning might be influenced by the fact that the
plaintiff could have been induced to purchased the product by the
representations made by the producer on the product itself, or by the
advertisement.
The question immediately arises: Should a label be required?
If a person is injured when the blade flys off a lawn mower the
first time it is started, should he have to show that there was a
label of safety or warning on the mower before he could sue the
manufacturer? Under this latter interpretation he would.
(4) There is broad language in the opinion making it susceptible to the more liberal interpretation that the court has finally
abrogated the privity requirement for warranty and has adopted
in effect a theory of strict liability:
Under modern marketing conditions a manufacturer places
goods upon the market in sealed containers, and the container
without substantial change is sold to the ultimate purchaser in the
condition in which it is placed by the manufacturer on the market for sale. By placing its goods upon the market, the manufacturer represents to the public that they are suitable and safe
for use, and by packaging, advertising, and otherwise, frequently
upon a national scale, it does everything it can to induce that
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belief. The middleman is no more than a conduit, a mere mechanical device through which the thing is to reach the ultimate consumer. The manufacturer has invited and solicited
the use of its product, and when it leads to disaster it should not
be permitted to avoid the responsibility by saying that it made no
contract with the consumer. The manufacturer should be held
liable because it is in a position to insure against liability and add
the cost to the product.' 6
In this paragraph the court states the forceful argument that a
manufacturer ought to be held accountable if his product causes injury to a lawful user or consumer even though the manufacturer is
not negligent. This sounds like the theory of strict liability in tort.
In dictum 1 the court strengthens this interpretation by reference to
Justice Sharp's concurring opinion in Terry. Evidently the court
intended to incorporate into Tedder the legal principles stated in
this concurrence which had cogently argued for the demise of privity
in food product cases, contending that the manufacturer should be
held liable, label or not."' Though the case concerned food products
in sealed containers, the same policy arguments apply to non-food
articles as in Corprew. Under this last interpretation, a consumer
would have recourse against the manufacturer whether or not the
product was in a sealed container or a label was attached thereto.
The manufacturer would be subject to strict liability.
While rejoicing at the prospects of privity's departure, lawyers
must remember that the manufacturer is not being served to the
" Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 491, 157 S.E.2d 98, 102
(1967). It is arguable that the court was talking about negligence only, but
the broad language would indicate that the court was also referring to "warranty."
" As to implied warranty as between manufacturer and consumer, in
the absence of immediate privity of contract, in respect of food and
drink placed on the market by the manufacturer in sealed containers,
see the legal principles set forth in the concurring opinion of Sharp,
J., in Terry v. Bottling Co., 253 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753, and the application thereof in our decision of May 10, 1967, in Tedder v. Bottling
Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337.
Id. at 498, 157 S.E.2d at 107.
8
Having held him to his label in Simpson v. Oil Co., smpra, can we
seriously argue or reasonably contend that a manufacturer or supplier
who, after extensive advertising, sells a retailer bottled drinks, canned
pineapple, or boxes of candy for resale to the consumer, does not likewise represent to the buying public that his product is fit to eat, even
though no label or imprint on the container specifically says so?
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 12-13, 138 S.E.2d 753,
761 (1967) (Sharp, J., concurring).
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consumer on a silver platter. The plaintiff must still prove his case.
It is necessary for him to show that: (1) he was injured by the
manufacturer's product; (2) the injury was due to a defect in the
product; (3) the defect existed when the product was sold to the
plaintiff; and (4) the product was being reasonably used for the
purposes intended. 19
In the area of damages, the type of loss for which recovery is
sought will be important. Where economic loss is involved the
plaintiff must show compliance with the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code to recover from the seller.20 Recovery in a tort
action for personal injury and property damage is possible against
the seller and the manufacturer under the Code,2 ' since it is neutral
on the privity requirement.2 2 Under two of the interpretations of
Corprew, proof of a label would be necessary if the customer sought
recovery from the manufacturer for injury to person or property.
Corprew sued for losses incurred when crops were damaged, which
the court treated as property damage. If the plaintiff had been
seeking to recover the cost of the chemical because it was ineffective,
the recovery sought would have been for loss of the commercial
bargain-economic loss. In such an action in contract " the court
probably would not have allowed the plaintiff to go against the
manufacturer, even though a label were present, since the plaintiff
would be seeking recovery on his contract in the absence of privity.
If the plaintiff attempts to recover the loss of the bargain from the
seller, he needs no label since his action is directed against the seller
with whom he contracted. Here the purchaser has relied only on
the bargain between himself and the seller. These two parties set the
terms of the agreement and if the bargain is not fulfilled the plaintiff
has recourse against the seller.
The proof of the elements necessary for recovery against the
19 Id.
at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 755.
20
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1) (d) ; § 2-106(1) ; § 2-607(3) (a).
21
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2) (b).
§ 2-318, comment 3.

" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

"The New Jersey court has had trouble already in mixing the contract
and tort theories in Santor v. A &M Karagheunian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965), where it allowed a purchaser to recover the value of the product
from the manufacturer for the loss of the bargain. The California court, in
dictum, separated the two types of losses and stated that strict liability
should govern personal injuries as well as physical injury to property, but
that "breach of warranty" was the proper action to recover for loss of
commercial bargain. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d
145 (1965).
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manufacturer on a "warranty" action remains a formidable task.
The plaintiff can perhaps take advantage of circumstantial evidence
and inferences from the facts, but he will still have to overcome
any inference that the defect was caused by intervening parties,
including himself, or by a long lapse of time between manufacture
and use.2 4 There is no warranty that the product will not eventually
deteriorate after a long period or if it is misused and abused.2 5
These are matters of evidence, but proof that a defect existed when
it left the manufacturer is only one step removed from proving
fault, i.e., negligence, by the producer. For products sold in sealed
containers the burden is perhaps less weighty since there is a reasonable inference that any harmful substance in the product became
sealed within it when it was manufactured. This, of course, is not
conclusive. The fact that the package is sealed goes far in proving
that the defect was in the package when sold to the plaintiff, but the
manufacturer need not fear that it will be "taken to the cleaners"
by every claimant seeking enrichment on a spurious claim.26
In a products liability case where a person has suffered personal
injury or property damage, he has recourse against the processor
under the theories of negligence, warranty, or strict liability. Corprew has implications for the plaintiff regardless of which theory he
selects.
(1) Negligence remains a proper theory for recovery, and Corprew only officially cancels the privity requirement. The plaintiff,
however, will have to sustain the extra burden of showing fault by
the manufacturer without the aid of res ipsa loquitur and under the
27
weight of the "similar instances" rule in North Carolina.
(2) The plaintiff can also sue for breach of warranty-express,
implied and implied for special purposes.2 8 Under the Simpson doctrine he could rely on express warranty for his cause of action, but
"Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826
(1964); Gomex v. E.W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211 N.Y.S.2d 246
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
"See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the

Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1144 (1960).
- Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 10, 138 S.E.2d 753,
759 (1964).
2 Graham v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 188, 125 S.E.2d
429 (1962); Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180
S.E. 582 (1935).
"'For an example of an implied warranty for special purposes, see UNIFORm COmmERciAL CODE § 2-315, comment 2.
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this might be limited to food and drink unless Corprew reasserts that
doctrine for nonconsumption items. Under a theory of implied
warranty in food cases he might bring an action under the Tedder
decision.2 9
To be considered with a "warranty" theory is the impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code which went into effect in North Carolina
last year. The Code establishes a warranty by law in all sales of
goods, 0 but does not require privity for a warranty action against the
manufacturer. As noted, the Code's official position is one of neu2
trality,' but it requires that notice of breach of warranty be given,
and the warranties themselves can be disclaimed. 3
(3) Finally, if Corprew can be interpreted broadly as rejecting
the privity rule for "warranty actions," the plaintiff could bring an
action under the theory of strict liability. The language used in the
opinion resembles the language of strict liability in tort, 4 but the
court uses the phrase "breach of warranty" instead. Strict liability
is non-fault liability. The manufacturer is held liable for injuries
caused by a defective product even if it has exercised the highest
degree of care and skill. If the court has indeed adopted strict
liability in tort for the manufacturer, it is submitted that the continued use of the word "warranty" is undesirable and should be rejected in favor of the more accurate phrase-"strict liability in
tort." "Warranty" is a contract term, as is recognized by the court,"
and in this area the distinction between tort and contract is important. Professor Prosser, in several law review articles, 80 refers
to sales warranty as the offspring of the illicit relationship between
29 Problems may arise in determining what the implied warranty covers.
In Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961), where a bottle
of Coke exploded in the plaintiff's hands, the court held there was no liability
even to the retailer since an implied warranty did not extend to the container. Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (e), recovery
against the retailer would be allowed.
0
" UNIFORM
"1 UNIFORM
2
UNIFORM
3

COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE §H 2-313 to -315.
CODE § 2-318, comment
CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
CODE § 2-316.

3.

' Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 9, 15
(1966). Prosser states that twenty-two jurisdictions have adopted strict
liability for all products on one theory or another.
2

Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3, 138 S.E.2d 753,

754 (1964).

" Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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tort and contract and argues for its discontinued use to describe strict
liability.3 7 Liability for "breach of warranty" is the proper term
to be used to refer to a breach in a contractual relation. Strict liability should be employed to describe the liability imposed by law on
the manufacturer regardless of fault. The Restatement of Torts
adopts the strict liability theory without using the word "warranty"3 8
and a comment urges this practice.3 9 This section of the Restatement
has been adopted in several states by judicial decision.40
By using the terminology of strict liability as recommended by
the Restatement, the court would also avoid the confusion and problems that are likely to arise with the notice of breach and disclaimer
" "Why not, then, talk of strict liability in tort, a thing familiar enough
in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, libel, misrepresentation, and respondeat superior, and
discard the word "warranty" with all of its contract implications ?" Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Conomer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 802 (1966).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
"RESTATEMENT
states:

(SECOND)

OF TORTS §

402A (1965), comment m,

The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions ...
of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not
affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by
limitations to "buyer" and "seller" in [the Code]. . . . Nor is the
consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a
reasonable time after it occurs as is provided by [the Code]. The
consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it is between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer's hands. In short, "warranty"
must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in connection
with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated
as merely one of strict liability in tort.
"' Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Ford
Motor Co, v. Lonam, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
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sections of the Code. 4 1 The Code is a statute designed to codify
the law of commercial transactions. Strict liability in tort-and it
bears repeating-is liability without fault, imposed by law on the
manufacturer for personal injury or physical damage to property
caused by its product.
At the least it seems safe to forecast that Corprew signals
stormy weather for privity in the near future. Currently, the case
can be limited to the abolition of the privity rule only where labeled
products are sold in sealed containers. With the proper set of facts,
however, the court might be convinced to impose strict liability
expressly on the manufacturer across the board since it is clear that
the theory does not provide automatic recovery for the consumer.
ROBERT A. WICKER

Trusts-Cy rres Enacted in North Carolina
The 1967 General Assembly enacted legislation giving North
Carolina courts power to use the doctrine of cy pres' in charitable
trust administration. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
long rejected the cy pres doctrine2 while upholding modification
"'In a California case which involved the UNIFORM SALES ACT, not
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, the California court held that where
damages were sought for personal injuries no notice was required in an
action for breach of warranty. The court treated the potential liability as
non-contractual in nature and referred to it as strict liability. Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). See generally
Comment, Products Liability-Sales Warranties of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 46 N.C.L. REv. 451 (1968).
3The words "cy pres" are Anglo-French for "as near" and were originally part of the phrase "cy pres comme possible" meaning "as near as possible." The doctrine of cy pres gives to a court the power to alter the particular purpose of a charitable trust under certain circumstances. Where
the testator or settlor intended that the trust property be applied to some
particular purpose and yet also had a more general charitable intent, he
presumably would have desired that the property be applied to a purpose
"as near as possible" to the specific disposition chosen by him rather than
that the trust be allowed to fail. Therefore, if the particular purpose named
by the settler becomes impossible, illegal, or impracticable, the court will
exercise its cy pres powers to select a disposition similar to that named by the
settlor or testator. The cy pres doctrine is limited in its use to charitable
trusts and is widely accepted among United States jurisdictions. See G.
BOGERT, TRUSTS § 431 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; A.
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT].
' As to the previous status of the cy pres doctrine in North Carolina, see
E, Fiscii, THE CY P'ns DQrTRINE IN TH UNITED STATES § 2 .03(g) (1950)

